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1. Introduction 
This appeal concerns the applicability of a constitutional rule made retroactive by 
the United States Supreme Court. Despite the clear language of the opinion in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), the State argues that Montgomery only 
appiies to mandatory fixed-life sentences for juveniles. On that narrow and improper 
reading of the law, the State argues that Mr. Windom has absolutely "no possibility of 
success" on his Eighth Amendment claim (Respondent's Brief, hereinafter "RB" 7), and 
therefore, this Court must affirm the procedural default applied by the district court. 
However, as set forth in detail below, the State's erroneous reading of Montgomery has 
been rejected by a majority of the members of United States Supreme Court, as well as a 
number of state courts, which have now consistently remanded discretionary fixed-life 
sentences for juveniles for reconsideration. 1 
Once this Court rejects the State's view of the case law, the question before this 
Court becomes "How does a juvenile sentenced to an unconstitutional fixed-life sentence 
in 2007 obtain relief in the Idaho Courts?" The State takes the position that Idaho's 
procedural rules trump a new rule of substantive constitutional law. It argues that Mr. 
Windom cannot justify the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief even within a 
reasonable period after the new law to be retroactively applied has been established. This 
1In fact, many state courts have applied the principles set forth in Montgomery to 
"de facto" life sentences where juveniles have been given lengthy but less than fixed-life 
sentences. See, infra at 15-18. 
1 
means that a person so sentenced is without a remedy for the constitutional violation and 
must remain incarcerated for the remainder of his natural life despite the United States 
Supreme Court's directive to the states to remedy these violations. In making retroactive 
its ruling regarding the requirements necessary to permit incarceration of a juvenile until 
death, the Supreme Court granted reiief to a person who had been incarcerated for over 
fifty years before the filing of his petition for relief. Mr. Windom sought relief one day 
after the United States Supreme Court decision and acted with all deliberate speed to have 
the Idaho courts apply the Eighth Amendment to his sentencing. 
In its decision affirming Mr. Windom's fixed-life sentence, this Court did not 
apply the Eighth Amendment principles regarding juvenile sentences. State v. Windom, 
150 Idaho 873, 880, n. 2,253 P.3d 310 (2011). Since this Court concluded the Eighth 
Amendment did not apply despite the dissenting opinion of Justice Warren Jones and Mr. 
Windom's Petition for Rehearing, this Court now has the opportunity to remand this case 
to the district court for full consideration of the merits of this claim in light of the United 
States Supreme Court decisions. Therefore, this Court should reverse the denial of the 
motion to amend the petition, remand and grant an evidentiary hearing for full 
consideration of the claim that Mr. Windom is not among the "rarest of children" for 
whom a fixed-life sentence is constitutionally appropriate. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 
726. 
2 
In addition, this Court should reverse the summary dismissal of the other claims in 
the petition and direct the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether 
tolling should be applied given Mr. Windom's mental status and the lack of advice 
provided by his appellate counsel. The instant petition was Mr. Windom's first. This 
case presents this Court with the opportunity to establish guidelines for the tolling of the 
statute of limitations for unrepresented, indigent defendants in post-conviction petitions, 
especially those who are provided no advice about the applicable time limits by the very 
counsel who have an inherent conflict of interest, as his or her representation on appeal 
may be at the heart of such a petition. 
2. The District Court Erred In Denying Petitioner's Motion to Amend with an 
Eighth Amendment Claim 
The State argues on three separate grounds that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion to deny the motion to amend: I) the original petition was untimely and thus any 
amendment was properly denied; 2) the fact that petitioner was a juvenile was known 
well before the amendment was filed and the establishment of a new legal precedent has 
no effect on the application of the statute of limitations; and 3) the United States Supreme 
Court did not establish new legal precedent in Montgomery. 
A. Even if the Claims in the Original Petition are Deemed 
Untimely, the Eighth Amendment Claim Was Timely Filed 
In Idaho, each claim within a petition must be assessed for compliance with the 
statute of limitations or exceptions thereto. See, Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 24 7, 250-51, 
3 
220 P.3d 1066 (2009); I.C. §§ 19-4901 ("any issue") and 4908 ("any ground"). Thus, 
even if the claims in the original petition were untimely, which is not conceded, the court 
must examine the timeliness of the new claim separately. Indeed, had Mr. Windom filed 
a new separate petition, the court would have been required to determine whether the new 
petition was filed in a reasonabie time. See, I.C. § 19-4908; Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 174 P .3d 870 (2007).2 There is no reason why this rule should not apply in 
this case and the State does not cite to contrary case law. 
Thus, the question is whether the claim sought to be raised in the amendment was 
properly barred by the district court as untimely. The State concedes that in non-capital 
cases Idaho permits courts to consider the nature of the claim in determining whether a 
petition is timely filed under I.C. § 19-4908. (RB 11-12.) Both parties rely on this 
Court's language in Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho at, 251, for this proposition. (See, 
Appellant's Opening Brief, hereinafter "AOB" at 10-11.) 
The State does not contest that the Eighth Amendment claim is an "important due 
process" issue; here, Mr. Windom is being deprived of his life and liberty because of the 
govermnent's action. Thus, this Court must determine whether Mr. Windom raised his 
Eight Amendment claim in a reasonably timely manner after becoming aware of the basis 
2To cover the possibility that this Court might rule that there was some legal 
difference between seeking to amend a petition and the filing of a new petition, Mr. 
Windom has filed a successive post-conviction petition in Ada County District Court 
raising the Eighth Amendment Claim. Ada County Case No. CVOl-17-01504. 
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for the claim. As set forth below and given the retroactive ruling in Montgomery, this 
Court must conclude that he acted in a timely fashion in seeking to amend the petition. 
B. The State Errs in Arguing that Petitioner's Age is the 
Controlling Factor in Determining Timeliness 
Having admitted that the nature of the claim involves a significant due process 
issue, the State rests its argument on a single thread -that Mr. Windom was aware that he 
was a juvenile when he committed his crime. Since this "fact" was always known, the 
State argues there is no justification to file a Montgomery claim now as his sentence was 
always violative of the Eighth Amendment. This argument puts the proverbial "cart 
before the horse" and ignores the legal principle that a petitioner is only entitled to relief 
if the facts as alleged violate the law or the United States Constitution. See, LC.§ 19-
4901 (1) ( emphasis added). It is only when the facts and the law establish a ground for 
relief that a petition can be filed. In this case, Petitioner filed his Eighth Amendment 
claim within one day of the United States Supreme Court decision in Montgomery, the 
case which established legal precedent for the claim by making its rule fully retroactive to 
all juvenile defendants. 
The State relies by analogy to situations where the legal bases for a particular 
claim have been well established by the courts. The holding that the federal constitution 
requires the State to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant was established over 
fifty years ago in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the Sixth Amendment right 
to the effective assistance of counsel was established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
5 
U.S. 668 (1984). When a petitioner seeks to raise claims based on these types ofwell-
established constitutional principles, the focus of the court is properly on when the "facts" 
supporting these claims became known to the petitioner. On the other hand, when the 
legal principle has not been established and held to be applied retroactively, the court 
cannot reject a petition soieiy because the "facts;; supporting a claim might have been 
known prior to the establishment of the legal basis for the claim. This Court has held that 
even when a claim may have been litigated before and generally barred under the 
principle of res judicata, there is an exception "where later case law suggests a conviction 
is unlawful," Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 766 n.12, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988), or where 
there "are changes in the controlling law." State v. Lankford (Bryan), 127 Idaho 608, 
618,903 P.2d 1305 (1995). 
The State implicitly acknowledges the significance of the impact of the ever-
evolving legal landscape in juvenile "life without parole" sentences by focusing the bulk 
of its argument on the legal implication of the Montgomery decision. (RB 13-26.) In 
essence, the State is conceding that if Montgomery is to be applied retroactively to Mr. 
Windom's sentence, he has filed a timely petition in Idaho. There can be no argument 
that Mr. Windom withheld that claim for an "unreasonable" period of time - he filed his 
motion to amend the day after Montgomery was decided. Thus, once this Court 
detennines, as it should, that Montgomery created a rule fully applicable to all persons 
sentenced to fixed life for crimes committed as juveniles, it must remand and direct the 
6 
district to court to pennit the amendment of the petition and then consider the merits of 
the claim. Because the Montgomery claim involves such a change in the law and one 
made fully retroactive by the United States Supreme Court, the State's argument that this 
claim is time-barred must be rejected.3 
r, L£. n b1• 1 d 1 n .. , """' . ..-,, h'' '-'· 1v.1ontgome1y r:,sta 1isne tr1e Ketroactrvuy or rnor t1g m 
Amendment Cases and Expanded the Application of Eighth 
Amendment Law to Discretionary Fixed-Life Sentences 
Citing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and the number of times that 
decision uses the tenn "mandatory" to describe a juvenile life-without-parole sentence 
("no less than five times"), the State makes the unimpressive argument that Miller applied 
to only mandatory fixed-life sentence, thus, Montgomery "did not extend Miller to 
discretionary sentencing regimes. "4 (RB 17-18. )5 Despite the clear and unequivocal 
3Interestingly, the State ignores the specific language from the Court of Appeals in 
Guitierrez-Medina v. State, 157 Idaho 34, 37, 333 P.3d 849 (Ct. App. 2014), regarding 
the impact of a legal rule made retroactive on the question of equitable tolling which was 
relied upon in Appellant's Opening Brief at 11-12. If retroactivity does not justify 
equitable tolling or the application of the exception in LC. § 19-4908, Idaho would 
provide no access to the courts to remedy a constitutional violation that could not have 
been raised before the rule was made retroactive. 
4Indeed, the State's emphasis on the Court's use of the term "mandatory" in the 
Miller decision support's Windom's position that his Montgomery claim could not have 
been raised prior to the January 25, 2016 Supreme Court decision. 
5The State is correct that before Montgomery, Miller was applied by the United 
States Supreme Court only to mandatory sentencing schemes. See, e.g. Bell v. Uribe, 729 
F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013)("Because the sentence imposed was not mandatory, there 
is no violation of Miller.") But this limitation on the constitutional principle was changed 
by Montgomery as discussed more fully below. 
7 
language of Montgomery decision itself, and the subsequent state and federal decisions 
that have followed Montgomery, the State contends the case law does not "support 
Windom's claim that Montgomery expanded the holding of Miller." (RB 19.) The State 
tries to bolster this argument by pointing out that certiorari was granted in Montgomery 
solely to resolve a split in the authority on whether lvfiller 's hoiding was retroactive. In 
arguing that Miller applied only to mandatory fixed-life sentences, the State claims that 
"nowhere in Montgomery did the Court state, much less hold, that it was expanding 
Miller to discretionary sentencing regimes." (RB at 19.) These assertions ignore the 
Supreme Court's reasoning and plain language. 
Indeed, in the second sentence of Montgomery's opening paragraph, Justice 
Kennedy wrote, "In Miller v. Alabama [citation], the Court held that a juvenile convicted 
of a homicide offense could not be sentenced to life in prison without parole absent 
consideration of the juvenile's special circumstances in light of the principles and 
purposes a/juvenile sentencing." (Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 725 [emphasis added.].) 
Likewise, in the third paragraph of the opinion, Kennedy wrote, "Miller required that 
sentencing courts "consider a child's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for 
change before condemning him or her to die in prison." (Id. at 726 [ emphasis added].) 
8 
Justice Kennedy continued: 
Miller took as its starting premise the principle established in Roper 
and Graham that "children are constitutionally different from adults for 
purposes of sentencing." 567 U. S., at_, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464, 183 L. 
Ed. 2d 407,418 (citing Roper, supra, at 569-570, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L. 
Ed. 2d 1; and Graham, supra, at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825). 
These differences result from children's "diminished culpability and greater 
prospects for reform[.]" 
Id. at 733. 
Miller requires that before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, the 
sentencing judge take into account "how children are different, and how 
those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime 
in prison." [ Citation omitted]. 
Id. at 734 
While the Montgomery court recognized that a sentencer might encounter the "rare 
juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is 
impossible and life without parole is justified[,]" the Court found that given a child's 
"'diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change,' Miller made clear that 
'appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be 
uncommon.' [ Citation omitted.]" 
Miller, then, did more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile 
offender's youth before imposing life without parole; it established that the 
penological justifications for life without parole collapse in light of "the 
distinctive attributes of youth." [Citation]. [Emphasis added]. Even if a 
court considers a child's age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in 
prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose 
crime reflects "'unfortunate yet transient immaturity."' [Citations]. 
[Emphasis added]. Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life 
without parole is excessive for all but '"the rare juvenile offender whose 
9 
crime reflects irreparable corruption,"'[Citations], it rendered life without 
parole an unconstitutional penalty for "a class of defendants because of 
their status" -that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient 
immaturity of youth. [Citation] As a result, Miller announced a substantive 
rule of constitutional law. Like other substantive rules, Miller is retroactive 
because it "'necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant"' -here, 
the vast majority of juvenile offenders-'"faces a punishment that the law 
cannot impose upon him,'" [Citations]. 
Id. at 733-734. 
Clearly, the Supreme Court's overarching concern in Montgomery is not whether 
the sentence imposed is mandatory or discretionary, but whether the sentencing court 
considers the ''juvenile's special circumstances in light of the principles and purposes of 
juvenile sentencing." Id. at 725. 
As for the post-Montgomery decisions cited in Mr. Windom's opening brief and 
discounted by the State as "say[ing] nothing about the statutory scheme under which the 
sentence at issue was imposed, much less purport to expand Miller," (RB at 20), the State 
could not be more off the mark. 
In Mauricio v. California, 133 S.Ct. 524 (2012), the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded (GVR) the decision of the state court. 
Mauricio, a juvenile homicide offender tried as an adult, was sentenced to life without 
parole under California Penal Code section 190.5, subdivision (b), which sets the penalty 
for a defendant convicted of first degree murder with one or more special circumstances 
found true, who was 16 years of age or older and under the age of 18 years at the time of 
the commission of the murder, as "confinement in the state prison for [LWOP] or, at the 
10 
discretion of the court, 25 years to life." People v. Mauricio, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 3847, *28; 2013 WL 2358675. Under section 190.5, LWOP is the statutorily-
identified presumptive punishment for a 16- or 17-year-old special circumstance 
murderer, but a sentencing court may, in its discretion, for good reason found, impose a 
less severe sentence of 25 years to iife. See e.g., People v. Ybarra, 166 Cai.App.4th 
1069, 1089 (2008); People v. Guinn, 28 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1141-1142 (1994). This 
sentencing law is unlike the sentencing laws reviewed in Miller and is akin to a 
discretionary sentencing regime. 
On remand following the Supreme Court's GVR decision, the California Attorney 
General acknowledged at oral argument that remand for a new sentencing hearing in light 
of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Miller was appropriate, and the 
California Court of Appeal followed her lead, stating: 
Miller changed the focus of the sentencing decision; it "requires" trial 
courts "to take into account how children are different, and how those 
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 
prison." (Miller, supra, 132 S. Ct 2455, 2469, fn. omitted.) The trial court 
here certainly was aware that it had discretion to impose a term of 25 years 
to life, rather than L WOP. But that discretion was exercised through the 
LWOP presumptive sentence filter of People v. Ybarra, supra, 166 
Cal.App.4th 1069, 1089 and People v. Guinn, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1130, 
1141-1142. We are in no position to say how Miller might have affected the 
trial court's decision; we remand in light of the Attorney General's 
acknowledgment that giving the trial court the opportunity in the first 
instance to sentence Mauricio in light of Miller is a reasonable path to 
follow. We express no opinion on whether Miller compels a particular 
sentence in this case. 
People v. Mauricio, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3847 at *29-30. 
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The defendant in People v. Blackwell, 202 Cal. App. 4th 144 (2011 ), a minor at the 
time of his offenses, was similarly convicted in adult court for first degree murder with 
felony-murder special circumstances, burglary of an inhabited dwelling, and attempted 
robbery in an inhabited dwelling. The trial court imposed a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole under California's presumptive .fixed-iife, or, discretionary 25 years 
to life sentencing scheme, Blackwell appealed and the sentence was upheld: 
Here, the trial court was well aware that it could sentence appellant to 25 
years to life in lieu of LWOP. It declined to do so, based on appellant's 
history and the heinous nature of the offense. This was not an abuse of 
discretion, because a reasonable jurist could conclude that the 
circumstances of the case did not warrant a deviation from the presumptive 
L WOP sentence. 
See Id. at 159. This court of appeal decision was vacated and remanded in the Supreme 
Court's GVR. Blackwell v. California, 133 S.Ct. 837 (2013). 
As both of these California cases were still on direct appeal at the time Miller was 
decided, the issue of the retroactive application of Miller to Mauricio and Blackwell, 
whose direct appeals were already complete, was not at issue. That question was left 
unresolved until Montgomery was decided in 2016, making the prior Eighth Amendment 
rulings applicable to Mr. Windom whose direct appeal was completed more than a year 
before Miller was decided in 2012. 
While the State is correct that two justices dissented in Adams v. Alabama, 136 
S.Ct. 1796 (2016), it is clear that the majority of the Court was concerned not with 
whether the fixed-life sentence was mandatory, but whether the sentencing court had fully 
12 
considered the juvenile defendants' youth and attendant characteristics before imposing 
the harshest of all sentences available for children. 
In Adams, the Supreme Court vacated the L WOP sentence imposed after 
petitioner's initial death sentence was vacated following Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005), and remanded for consideration in light of lvfontgornery, despite the fact that the 
death sentence initially imposed allowed the jury to consider mitigating evidence and a 
sentence less than death. Justice Sotomayor correctly noted that remand for 
reconsideration in light of Montgomery was necessary because the sentence was "a 
product of that pre-Miller era" and "[after Miller, "youth is the dispositive consideration 
for 'all but the rarest of children."' 136 S.Ct. at 1800, (J. Sotomayor, concurring). 
Similarly, the Supreme Court issued GVR's in Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S.Ct. 11 
(2016) and Deshaw v. Arizona, 137 S.Ct. 370 (2016), on the same day this past fall. In 
Deshaw, the juvenile had been sentenced to fixed life under a discretionary sentencing 
scheme and the Arizona state court had held that Miller therefore did not apply; 
nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded for 
"further consideration in light of Montgomery." Id. at 370. No statement could be more 
emphatic that Montgomery applies to all juvenile fixed-life sentences, not just mandatory 
ones. 
Accordingly, the State is incorrect when it claims that the Supreme Court GVR's 
in these cases tells us "nothing" about the constitutionality of Mr. Windom's fixed-life 
13 
sentence. Put simply, the Supreme Court would have no reason to vacate and remand "in 
light of Montgomery" if the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment applied, as the State incorrectly argues, to only "mandatory" fixed-life 
sentences. (RB 17.) 
Arizona Supreme Court remanded two discretionary fixed-life sentences in light of 
Montgomery in State v. Valencia, 2016 Ariz. LEXIS, 754 Ariz .Adv. Rep. 11 (decided 
December 23, 2016). The trial courts in these cases had summarily dismissed post-
conviction petitions where the defendants' age had been considered by the sentencing 
court; in one case, the defendant was sentenced under a non-mandatory L WOP scheme. 
On appeal, the intermediate appellate court had concluded that "Miller, as broadened by 
Montgomery, is a significant change in the law" and reversed the summary dismissals. Id. 
at ,r 7. On review, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the dismissals and 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing where the defendants would have an opportunity to 
demonstrate that they were not "irreparably corrupt" and that the crime reflected 
"transient immaturity" factors that could not have been considered at the time of the 
initial sentencings. 6 
6Unlike Idaho, Arizona has a procedural court rule specifically allowing 
defendants to raise issues where "there has been a significant change in the law." Ariz. 
Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32.l(g). In Idaho, a defendant's sole remedy is the 
filing of a post-conviction petition. 
14 
In New Jersey state court, in two cases, in State v. Zuber and State v. Comer, 
which were consolidated for purposes of appeal, and decided earlier this month, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court considered whether "youth and its attendant characteristics" must 
be considered when a juvenile is sentenced to what amounts to a life prison sentence 
(Zuber- 110 years, Comer- 75 years) with decades of parole ineligibility (Zuber- 55 
years, Comer - 68 years and 3 months). In holding that these sentences must be re-
examined in light of Montgomery, the state supreme court noted that when first 
sentenced, the sentencing courts were not required to evaluate the mitigating effects of 
youth. The court then held that sentencing judges should evaluate the Miller factors when 
a juvenile is facing a lengthy term of imprisonment that is the practical equivalent of life 
without parole, and "take into account how children are different and how those 
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." State v. 
Zuber, 2017 N.J. LEXIS 5, (decided January 11, 2017).7 
7Similarly, in Georgia, Illinois, and Oklahoma, state courts have held that 
Montgomery requires the state courts to reconsider the imposition of juvenile life 
sentences to assure that there was a proper determination that the defendant was within 
the "very small class of juveniles" for whom a fixed-life sentence might be deemed 
constitutionally proportionate. Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 701, 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016); 
Dennis v. State, No. S16A1600, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 31, at *2-3 (Jan. 23, 2017); People v. 
Nieto, 52 N.E.3d 442 (Ill. App. 2016) and Luna v. State, 2016 OK CR 27, 2016 Okla. 
Crim. App. LEXIS 28 (decided December 2, 2016.) 
15 
Likewise, in State v. Ramos, 2017 Wash. LEXIS 75 (decided January 12, 2017), 
the Washington Supreme Court held that when a juvenile offender is sentenced in adult 
court, "youth matters on a constitutional level. . . . Therefore, where a convicted juvenile 
offender faces a possible life-without-parole sentence, the sentencing court must conduct 
. d' . ,.l i • ,.l i. • ,.l " k . b 1 • 1 • , . "" , ' ' an m iViuua1iZeu uearmg anu ta -e mto account 10w cm aren are ourerern, ano now 
those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." 
Ramos had initially been sentenced to a prison term of 960 months (80 years) for the 
murders of disabled man, his wife and their two young children during a home-invasion 
robbery. This was modified to a sentence of 85 years following resentencing. The court 
of appeal affirmed this sentence, reasoning that Miller was inapplicable because it applied 
to only literal life-without-parole sentences but not to de facto life-without-parole 
sentences. State v. Ramos, 198 Wn.2d 1009, 367 P.3d 1083 (2016). 
The state supreme court granted review to consider the question of whether Miller 
applied to defacto life sentences. Noting that the majority of jurisdictions that have 
considered the question and have held that Miller does apply to juvenile homicide 
offenders facing de facto life-without-parole sentences, the court rejected the notion that 
Miller applies only to literal, not de facto, life-without-parole sentences. 
Given that the majority of jurisdictions agree on this point and it is 
consistent with both common sense and Washington case law, we follow 
suit. Regardless of labeling, it is undisputed that Ramos was in fact 
sentenced to die in prison for homicide offenses he committed as a juvenile. 
Miller plainly provides that a juvenile homicide offender cannot be 
sentenced to die in prison without a meaningful opportunity to gain early 
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release based on demonstrated rehabilitation unless the offender first 
receives a constitutionally adequate Miller hearing. 
State v. Ramos, 2017 Wash. LEXIS 75, at* 17-18 (decided January 12, 2017). 
Relying on Millet and Montgomery, the Washington Supreme Court described the 
nature of the sentencing hearing now mandated by the Eighth Amendment: 
The court must receive and consider relevant mitigation evidence bearing 
on the circumstances of the offense and the culpability of the offender, 
including both expert and lay testimony as appropriate. The court and 
counsel have an affinnative duty to ensure that proper consideration is 
given to the juvenile's "chronological age and its hallmark 
features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate 
risks and consequences." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. It is also necessary to 
consider the juvenile's "family and home environment" and "the 
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his 
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may 
have affected him." Id. And where appropriate, the court should account for 
"incompetencies associated with youth" that may have had an impact on the 
proceedings, such as the juvenile's "inability to deal with police officers or 
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his 
own attorneys." Id. 
When making its decision, the court must be mindful that a 
life-without-parole sentence is constitutionally prohibited for juvenile 
homicide offenders whose crimes reflect "'unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity"' rather than "'irreparable corruption.'" Id. at 2469 ( quoting 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 573). Moreover, due to "children's diminished 
culpability and heightened capacity for change ... appropriate occasions for 
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon." 
Id. The sentencing court must thoroughly explain its reasoning, specifically 
considering the differences between juveniles and adults identified by the 
Miller Court and how those differences apply to the case presented. While 
formal written findings of fact and conclusions or law are not strictly 
required, they are always preferable to ensure that the relevant 
considerations have been made and to facilitate appellate review. 
Id. at 23-25. 
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Again, given the above-cited decisions, it is clear that as a result of Montgomery's 
retroactive application of the expanded Miller ruling, the district court erred in summarily 
denying the motion to amend the petition to add the Eighth Amendment claim. Mr. 
Windom was never provided the opportunity to present evidence and argument on the 
very factors that a court must duly consider to determine if a fixed-life sentence is 
constitutional. Therefore, this Court must remand to provide Mr. Windom that 
opportunity in an evidentiary hearing in the district court. 
Finally, the State erroneously argues that Mr. Windom ignores the dicta in the 
district court's summary dismissal that his sentence complied with the Eighth 
Amendment. (RB 26.) Mr. Windom argued in his opening brief that the district court's 
observations were incorrect and unsupported by the record. (AOB 12.) The sentencing 
record, which speaks for itself, demonstrates that the court did not undertake a 
Montgomery analysis. In it initial remarks before imposing sentence, the court stated, 
"This is going to be a lengthy sentence (sic), probably about 45 minutes, ... , but I think it 
is important to make very a clear record of what I'm doing and why I am doing it. (R. 53 
[emphasis added].) The court then began with the customary proforma sentencing litany: 
I have considered the nature of the offense. I have considered 
the mental health issues. I have considered mitigating and 
aggravating factors, for example, the relative youth. I have 
considered the fact that he does not have a long criminal 
record. 
(R. 53 [ emphasis added].) 
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The sentencing court then spent the next 45 minutes detailing the gruesome nature 
of the offense and explaining her skepticism of the mental health evidence. In making its 
"very clear record" during this lengthy monologue, the court touched upon Mr. Windom's 
juvenile status only once: 
(R. 54.) 
[Dr. Beaver] does opine that as [\Vindom] ages, the research 
tends to indicate that risk reduces, not necessarily to zero. 
Those are generalized research documents that don't 
necessarily have anything to do with Mr. Windom. These are 
not particular to Mr. Windom. 
This was the full extent of the sentencing court's consideration of Mr. Windom's 
juvenile status. Thus, the sentencing record clearly belies the district court's post-
sentencing attempt to recast the nature of the hearing as comporting with the requirements 
now mandated by the Montgomery decision that Mr. Windom is within that "rarest" of 
juveniles where a fixed-life sentence is warranted. Nowhere in the sentencing record is 
there a showing that the sentencing court considered how children are different from 
adults and how those differences were taken into account at sentencing. Because Mr. 
Windom's sentencing court did not consider "how children are different, and how those 
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison," Miller, 
132 S.Ct. at 2469,8 the case must be remanded. Furthermore, because Miller had not yet 
8In Deshaw v. Arizona, supra, the United States Supreme Court vacated the state 
court judgment and remanded for reconsideration under Montgomery, even though the 
state appellate court had relied on the fact that the sentencing judge "gave 'great weight' 
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been decided when Mr. Windom was sentenced, he was not even put on notice about the 
very issues which would determine whether he would ever be eligible for parole and he 
did not have the opportunity to present evidence on this issue. Since Mr. Windom's 
motion to amend was denied, he was also never permitted to present such evidence in the 
post-conviction proceedings. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the summary dismissal of the 
case and remand, the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine if 
a fixed-life sentence is constitutionally permissible and to provide Mr. Windom the 
opportunity to address the issues now constitutionally required of a sentencing court. 
3. The Court Erred in Denying Petitioner the Requested Discovery 
Mr. Windom has acknowledged that the petition was not filed within the one-year 
statute of limitations, but submits that his original Sixth Amendment claims should be 
permitted under the principles of equitable tolling. In order to prove equitable tolling 
based on Mr. Windom's mental status, counsel sought specific discovery of his 
correctional records from the Ada County Jail and the Idaho Department of Correction 
(IDOC). This request was denied. 
to Deshaw's 'youthful age' and 'his emotional and moral immaturity.' The court also 
gave 'significant weight' to Deshaw's difficult childhood and 'dysfunctional family 
experiences."' State v. Deshaw, 2015 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 513, *3; 2015 WL 
1833801. Mr. Windom' s sentencing did not make the type of findings contained in 
Deshaw which did not meet the standards required by the United States Supreme Court in 
light of Montgomery. 
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The State contends that the request for the issuance of subpoenas to obtain the jail 
and IDOC records "are the epitome of a fishing expedition." (RB 30.) Nothing could be 
further from the truth. A critical component of the equitable tolling assertion was Mr. 
Windom's mental status and his isolation housing. As the State concedes, there was 
extensive evidence that ]\fr. \Vindom suffered from mental illness and the recmds sought 
by Mr. Windom would have provided evidence regarding the effects of his illness and his 
housing status during the period during the tolling period. Of course, it is possible that 
the requested dispovery might have worked to defeat Mr. Windom's claim for equitable 
tolling; but the district court prevented him from obtaining potentially material evidence 
critical to his assertion of equitable tolling. 
The State argued that the infonnation was "known" to Mr. Windom and could 
have been included in his affidavit, and that there was not sufficient evidence in his 
affidavit to support the claim, and the district court adopted the State's argument in 
dismissing the petition. However, Mr. Windom's allegations in the affidavit might have 
been fully corroborated by the materials sought to be discovered and that information 
might have been enough to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, this Court should 
remand the matter to the district court with directions to permit the limited discovery 
request and then to reconsider whether equitable tolling should apply to the original 
claims in the petition. 
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4. The Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing the Petition as Untimely without 
Granting an Evidentiary Hearing on Equitable Tolling 
The State wants to parse the equitable tolling issue by separating its components 
instead of looking at its whole. Tolling is required in this case because of the 
combination of Mr. Windom's youth, mental status, and the abandonment by appointed 
counsel. 
During the one year period from the conclusion of his direct appeal, Mr. Windom 
suffered from mental illness and was receiving medication. Since the district court denied 
discovery, Mr. Windom was unable to present the complete picture of his mental status, 
how it impacted his housing situation and how that impacted his ability to gain access to 
the court; however, the State never disputed that he was mentally ill during this time 
period. 
His appellate counsel never infonned Mr. Windom that there was even a potential 
remedy for post-conviction relief or that there was a time limit for seeking that relief after 
the appeal concluded in 2011. Of course, appellate counsel was at that time operating 
under a direct conflict of interest because a petition for post-conviction relief might well 
have challenged the constitutional effectiveness of the attorney's representation. 
By sheer luck of being provided unsolicited advice from an attorney familiar with 
juveniles serving life sentences, Mr. Windom learned that he could still file a federal 
petition, even if the time for filing a petition in state court had already expired. That 
attorney provided a general form and Mr. Windom filed a rambling petition to the best of 
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his ability. Counsel was not appointed in the federal district court and Mr. Windom 
remained unrepresented until the Ninth Circuit appointed counsel in 2015. 
Mr. Windom concedes that the Court of Appeals has not adopted this approach to 
consideration of equitable tolling. See, Mahler v. State, 157 Idaho 212, 335 P.3d 57 (Ct. 
App. 2014 ). However, this Court should examine the unique combination of 
circumstances in their totality, especially in light of Mr. Windom's fixed-life sentence. 
When that is done, it becomes evident that the district court's summary dismissal was 
unwarranted and the matter should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the 
question of equitable tolling. 
5. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the orders of the district court 
summarily dismissing the petition and denying the motion to amend, and remand the case 
to the district court for full consideration of the merits of the petition. 
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